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NOTES
Constitutional Law: The Progeny of United States v.
Lopez and the Future of Judicial Review of Federal
Power Under the Commerce Clause*
L Introduction
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.1
If... the people should in future become more partial to the federal
than to the State governments, the change can only result from such
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will
overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence
where they may discover it to be most due . 2
Both of these statements were written in 1788 by James Madison in defense of
the newly proposed Constitution of the United States and the principle of division
of power between state and federal governments. Upon ratification of the
Constitution, the balance of state and federal power, as expected by Madison,
became an enduring source of conflict between those governments. Central to this
conflict has been the democratic choice - and it cannot be considered anything but
a choice - of the American people to allow the federal government greater power
and responsibility than what was originally contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution.
Although federal and state power have not continued to be divided as Madison
may have predicted,3 the separation of power - and the conflict it creates - has
still, in many ways, operated to preserve liberty and protect against tyranny. The
role of the Supreme Court in defining and preserving the separation of power
between state and federal governments, however, has proved most difficult and
* The Oklahoma Law Review has awarded the author the Harry Alley-Leroy Allen Memorial Prize
for the Outstanding Case Note of 1996.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320, 323 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 288 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966); THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966).
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troublesome. Particularly troubling has been the development of a principled
standard for the exercise of judicial review in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The vehicle for this expansion of federal power has been Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution - the Commerce Clause - which states: "The Congress shall
have [p]ower ... [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."4 The Commerce Clause has come to
affect people's lives in a multitude of ways. It allows federal regulation of what
people eat5 and where they sleep.6 The Commerce Clause allows federal regulation
of the hours that people work and the wages that they earn.8 It allows federal
regulation of crime,9 violence,"0 and racial discrimination." Indeed, for nearly
sixty years - from 1937 until 1995 - not one federal regulation was ruled by the
United States Supreme Court to be outside the boundaries of federal authority under
the Commerce Clause.
In the 1995 Tenn, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v.
Lopez" that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990" was beyond the power of
the federal governmrent under the Commerce Clause. In a five-to-four decision, the
Court found the act, which made illegal the possession of firearms within 1000 feet
of anfy school, to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power. 4
This note will examine the effects and ramifications of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Lopez. The first section will examine the history of
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. See Swift & Cc. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (upholding federal regulation
of the sale of cattle in stockyards); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding federal
regulation of the purely intrastate production of wheat).
6. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding federal
penalties for discriminatf on in places of public accommodation on the basis of race, color, religion, or
national origin).
7. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 (1937) (upholding federal regulation
of labor and management relations).
8. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (upholding federal regulation of
employment conditions in certain firms connected to interstate commerce).
9. See United States v. Wacker 72 F.3d. 1453, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal
prohibition of drug trafficking under the Comprehensive Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994)); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925) (upholding the Dyer Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2312, which prohibited the transportation of stolen vehicles across state lines); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C § 2421, which prohibited the
transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes).
10. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 891, which
criminalized "loansharking" or the use of violence or the threat of violence to collect debts).
11. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (upholding federal penalties for
discrimination by public restaurants on the basis of race, color, or national origin).
12. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
13. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 provided in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). In this context, "[tihe term 'school
zone' means - (A) in, or on the ground of, a public, parochial or private school; or (B) within a distance
of 1,000 feet from the ground of a public, parochial or private school." Id. § 921(a)(25).




federalism and the debate over the Commerce Clause power. Second, the note will
examine the opinions articulated in United States v. Lopez and will provide a critical
analysis of those opinions. The third section will consider the early progeny of
United States v. Lopez and look into possible areas of future action. Finally, the
note will present an alternative approach and an argument for a new judicial
analysis in defining the balance of state and federal power.
II. History
In the broad architecture of the United States Constitution, power is divided
between the two structures of state and federal governments. State governments
were given broad and general police powers over local affairs, including the
regulation and preservation of the health, welfare, and morals of the people. The
federal government was given much more limited power, restricted to only those
powers enumerated in the Constitution. It is a system that was designed to prevent
tyranny, preserve liberty, and to better promote civic virtue among the individual
citizens of the nation. s
A. The Power of the Federal Government Under the Commerce Clause: Gibbons
v. Ogden and Early Expansiveness
The early period of Supreme Court consideration of the Commerce Clause power
is a time characterized by relatively great deference to Congress and an expansive
view of federal power. 6 The first Commerce Clause case considered by the
Supreme Court was the landmark Gibbons v. Ogden.7 In Gibbons, Chief Justice
John Marshall articulated an expansive view of federal regulatory power. The State
of New York had granted a steamboat monopoly to a partnership, and, when
Gibbons began operating a competing ferry service from New York to New Jersey,
a suit was brought for encroachment on the monopoly. 8 Popular sentiment ran
strong against monopolies, and Marshall seized the opportunity to disguise within
the political cause a much more important doctrine. Marshall ruled that the state-
granted monopoly interfered with a federal statute, and, as that federal statute was
a proper exercise of power under the Commerce Clause, the state action was
preempted by the federal action under the dictates of the Supremacy Clause."
15. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION
(1992); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS; COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
(1971).
16. See FEUX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
(1937).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1924).
18. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-2. New York had granted the steamboat monopoly to a
partnership, which had in turn granted it to Ogden. Id.
19. Id. at 1. Marshall's opinion stopped short of giving the federal government an exclusive power
to regulate commerce. Marshall held that the federal government's power to regulate commerce coexisted
with the states, except where state regulations interfered with federal regulations. The only commercial
activities which were exclusive to state or local regulation were those of the "internal commerce of a
state," specifically those "which are completely within a state, which do not affect other states, and with
1996]
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Marshall defined the language of the Commerce Clause broadly. He wrote that
commerce included "every species of commercial intercourse, ' a much more
inclusive definition than the prevailing understanding of commerce as merely the
sale and transfer of goods. Marshall also broadly defined the federal government's
power "to regulate,"'" stating that that power, "like all others vested in Congress,
is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."'
For most of the nineteenth century, the relatively minor role of the federal
government provoked few questions concerning the extent of federal power. Rather,
the great majority of decisions dealt with the "dormant" Commerce Clause and
whether state commerce regulation was permissible in areas where the federal
government had'not acted.'
B. The Reaction to Increasing Federal Regulation in the Industrial Age
The question of the extent of federal Commerce Clause power took on new sig-
nificance with the advent of the Industrial Age and the resulting increase in federal
regulation. In 1895, a sugar manufacturer was prevented from purchasing four
competing sugar refineries by federal antitrust regulation. The Court, in United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,2 held that the federal government's actions went beyond
its Commerce Clause authority.2
5
The Court held that federal power was limited by both intrinsic and extrinsic
forces. First, the Court held that the Commerce Clause only authorizes the
regulation of certain types of activities and determined the sovereignty over each
type by measuring the directness of the activity's effect on interstate commerce."
In E.C. Knight, the Court held that the manufacture of sugar was not subject to
federal regulation because manufacturing does not have a sufficiently direct effect
on interstate commerce. However, if the government had sought to regulate the
trade of sugar, that is the sale or transfer of sugar, the regulation would have been
upheld.' Second, the Court drew strongly from the concept of dual federalism,
giving rise to the view that the Tenth Amendment actively reserved the regulation
which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government." Id. at 195.
20. Id. at 193.
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
22. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
23. This note will not include the related but separate issue of federal preemption of state action
where the federal government is acting under Commerce Clause authority. See Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 H3w.) 299 (1857) (establishing the "selective exclusiveness" doctrine which forbid
states from regulating commercial activities that necessitated uniform federal legislation). For an
extensive inquiry into the modem usefulness of the "dormant" Commerce Clause analysis, see Julian N.
Eule, Laying the Dornumt Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982).
24. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
25. Id. at 17-18.
26. Id. at 15-16.




of certain activities to the states and, thus, imposed an extrinsic limit on the reach
of Commerce Clause power.'
The limits recognized in E.C. Knight did not, however, engender an immediate
turn in the Supreme Court's interpretation of Commerce Clause power. 9 Federal
regulations were widely upheld throughout the early years of the twentieth century.
During this period, the scope of federal regulatory power increased in a number of
important ways. The power of the federal government was held to include
regulation of certain purely intrastate activities that were connected to interstate
commerce." The power of the federal government "to regulate" was affirmed as
plenary and without limitation, such that it allowed even outright prohibition.'
And, the power of the federal government was held to include, in certain limited
instances, regulation for purposes more moral than commercial in nature. 2
The shift in the Supreme Court's understanding of Commerce Clause authority
was not swift; but, when it arrived, it was powerful indeed. The majority of the
Court, dedicated to preserving the economic principles they believed to be inherent
in the Constitution, turned from an expansive view of federal power under the
Commerce Clause to a restrictive treatment of federal power in favor of states'
rights. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,33 the Court struck down a child labor act which
prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced in factories
employing children and failing to comply with a set of age-based labor restric-
tions . ' The *majority held that the act regulated the conditions of production, as
distinguished from commerce, and therefore lacked a sufficiently direct effect on
interstate commerce to allow federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.35
C. The Rise and Fall of Active Judicial Review of Commerce Clause Authority in
the New Deal Era
The economic activism of the New Deal era focused a sharp eye on the direct-
indirect effects test and the principles by which the Court had arrived at its
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.6, at 146-51 (5th ed.
1995).
30. See The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914) (upholding federally imposed rate
structures for railroads because of the activity's economic effect on interstate commerce); see also Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1905) (upholding federal regulation of the sale of cattle
in stockyards because the activity was in the stream or "current" of interstate commerce).
31. See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903) (upholding federal
prohibition of the transportation of lottery tickets across state lines).
32. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 326 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421, which prohibited the transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes).
33. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276-77.
35. Id. at 269-77. The Court analyzed the act in terms of the directness of the regulated activity's
effect on interstate commerce and whether the activity was reserved for state regulation by the Tenth
Amendment. Il Inherent in the majority's reasoning was the idea that there was no threat of the
distribution of flawed goods - an economic effect that may have pushed the activity past the
"directness" threshold; rather, there was only the issue of the health and welfare of the children, an issue
of state-regulated police power. ld. at 271-72.
1996]
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distinctions between those activities which are commerce and those which are not.
Initially, very few of the New Deal statutes, each attempting a national cure of the
troubled economy, survived the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause power.'
In 1935, the Court, considering A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,37 held that the employment practices of intrastate poultry dealers did not
have a sufficiently direct connection to interstate commerce and, therefore, ruled the
National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional. 8 The Schechter decision
signalled the first offensive in what would be an intense battle between the political
and judicial branches of the federal government.39 In 1937, the Court, in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.," struck down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.4
The Court held that the relationship between coal factory employers and employees
was a matter of production and not commerce.4 As such, the federal regulation
was of a "purely local activity," reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the states
unless there could be shown a direct effect on interstate commerce.43 The Court
stated that the production of coal may greatly affect interstate commerce without
directly affecting it." Although the weaknesses of the direct-indirect effects test
- easy pliability and misleading "formalism" - were becoming more and more
clear, the majority of the Court still clung to the hope of a test which would
separate state and federal power, fearing that the failure to do so would result in the
practice of all-encompassing police powers by Congress and the subsequent
elimination of state power and federalism.
D. The Emergence of the Rational Basis Test and a Return to Judicial Deference
to the Legislature
Under increasing political and ideological pressure, the Court soon abandoned its
position and returned to a policy of deference to the legislature. In 1937, the Court
considered the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),45
which had established a comprehensive system of labor and management relations.
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,' the Court made an unstated change in
36. 'See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 4.7, at 151-55.
37. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
38. Id. at 551. Through the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90,48 Stat. 195, Congress
delegated to private businesses the power to draft a code for "fair competition," which would be
submitted to the President for approval. A "Live Poultry Code" which regulated the conditions and price
of labor was approved for poultry dealers in New York City. A.LA. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 523.
39. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 4.7, at 154-55 (relating a brief account of the New
Deal crisis and the proposed "Court-packing" plan).
40. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
41. The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824,49 Stat. 991, in an attempt to stabilize
the national coal industry, established coal boards which set minimum coal prices, wage rates, and labor
terms. Any coal producer who did not comply with the regulations was subject to a tax.
42. Carter, 298 U.S. at 303.
43. Id. at 304.
44. Id. at 308-09.
45. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-165 (West 1935).




analysis: the Court did not look to the direct effect of labor relations on interstate
commerce but merely held that intrastate activities could be regulated if they had
a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.' 47 With this switch in
analysis, the Court began to reject the notion that certain categories of activities -
such as production and manufacturing - were not subject to Commerce Clause
authority.
The implicit change in analysis became an explicit change in law when the Court,
in United States v. Darby,48 specifically overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart49 and the
direct-indirect effects test. The distinctions between activities made in previous
decisions based on the directness of their effect on interstate commerce were
rejected as hollow and unrealistic "formalism," with little meaning beyond what the
various former justices had supplied. The Court held that Congress could regulate
any intrastate activities that "affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power
of Congress over it.' Moreover, Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
would be bound by no extrinsic limitatiohs - including the Tenth Amendment -
except those checks on its power in the Bill of Rights. The Court wrote, "The
[Tenth] [A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been sur-
rendered."'"
Perhaps the most significant step in the fall of active judicial review of Com-
merce Clause legislation occurred with Wickard v. Filburn.2 In Wickard, the Court
looked to the cumulative effects of intrastate wheat production on interstate
commerce, holding that small-scale intrastate activities are subject to federal
regulation if the activities are part of an aggregate interstate concern.
53
Since 1937, the Commerce Clause has been used as authority for a wide scope
of federal regulations. The standard that evolved to determine Congress' power over
each of these activities was whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that the activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.' Under the rational basis
I
interfering with union activities. Id. at 22. The Court held that the regulation of intrastate labor relations
was within the power of the federal government under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 43.
47. Id. at 37.
48. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Darby was charged with a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods violating
prescribed wage rates and labor conditions, and prohibited the employment of workers at less than the
prescribed conditions in firms engaged in interstate commerce.
49. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
50. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118.
51. Id. at 124, For further inquiry, see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1950).
52. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard, a farmer who grew wheat largely for his own consumption and
use, was* charged with exceeding the bushel allotment assigned to him under the exercise of the
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113. While the wheat
produced by Wickard did not in and of itself amount to a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the
aggregate national supply and demand of wheat clearly did. It should be noted that Wickard, contrary
to common understanding, sold a portion of his wheat crop. Id. at 114.
53. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
54. "[W]hen Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need
inquire only whether the finding is rational." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
1996]
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test, the Commerce Clause has become the fountainhead of the regulatory power of
the federal government. For nearly sixty years - from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.5 in 1937 until United States v. Lopez'6 in 1995 - no federal
regulation was ruled by the Supreme Court to be beyond the power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause.
III. United States v. Lopez
A. Facts
On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a senior at Edison High School in San
Antonio, Texas, went to school carrying a concealed .38 caliber pistol and five
bullets. After being confronted by school officials, Lopez was charged under Texas
law with possession of a firearm on school premises. The state charges were
dismissed when federal charges for violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990' were filed.
The district court, after denying Lopez's motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act is unconstitutional as beyond the federal
government's power under the Commerce Clause, convicted and sentenced Lopez
to six months imprisonment and two years' supervised release." On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, citing insufficient congressional findings of
a connection between gun possession in schools and interstate commerce, held that
the Act was beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.9 The
conviction was reversed.' The United States Supreme Court granted writ of
certiorari in April 1994.1
B. Holding
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to regulate gun
possession in school zones. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which required no connection to interstate
travel, shipment, or manufacture, was invalid as beyond the power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause.62
C. The Rehnquist Majority
Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion for the majority of the Court,'
452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
55. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
56. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
58. Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 55a, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The
order of the district court is unreported.
59. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994) (order granting certiorari).
62. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.




began his analysis with a history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That history,
Rehnquist argued, while demonstrating an expansive view of federal Commerce
Clause power, should not be read to completely deny the Court the power to enforce
limits on federal Commerce Clause power.' Although not used in sixty years,
"judicially enforceable outer limits"' on Commerce Clause power undoubtedly
exist, according to Rehnquist.'
Rehnquist articulated three categories of activities that are within the Commerce
Clause power. First, Congress has the power to regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce." This category would include regulation of the availability
and use of interstate shipment and travel. Second, Congress has the power to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.' This category
would include, for example, regulation of planes, trains, and automobiles used for
interstate transportation. Finally, Congress has the power to regulate those activities
which substantially affect interstate commerce.'
Rehnquist held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act regulated neither the channels
nor the instrumentalities of interstate commerce20 Thus, for the Act to be
sustained, it must fall within the third category of permissible federal power. The
Court held that firearm possession in school zones does not substantially affect
interstate commerce and, thus, the Act is beyond the power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause."
The first rationale of the holding was the noncommercial nature of gun possession
in schools. The Court found that Lopez did not fit within a pattern of previous cases
in which the Court had upheld regulation of intrastate economic activity that
substantially affected interstate commerce.' Rehnquist wrote that even Wickard v.
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice O'Connor. Justice Thomas filed
a separate concurring opinion.
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
Justices Stevens and Souter filed separate dissenting opinions.
64. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
65. Id. at 1633.
66. Id. at 1628-29.
67. As examples of regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, Rehnquist cited
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the prohibition of interstate shipment of goods
which violated certain labor standards) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding federal penalties for discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin because it is rational for Congress to conclude that such discrimination
affects interstate travel and, therefore, interstate commerce). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
68. This power applies even if the danger to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is only
from intrastate activities. As examples of permissible federal action in this regard, Rehnquist cited the
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding federally imposed rate structures for railroads)
and Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding federal safety requirements for
vehicles used in intrastate commerce). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
69. Resolving what he characterized as "ambiguity" in past cases, Rehnquist held that an activity's
effect on interstate commerce must be substantial in order to permit federal action under the Commerce
Clause. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1634.
72. Explaining the absence of a connection to economic activity in the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
1996]
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Filburn,73 which he: characterized as "the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity,"'74 contained a closer connection to
economic activity than Lopez.
The Court also distinguished the Gun-Free School Zones Act from statutes which
are limited in scope to merely those activities which are shown, on a case-by- case
basis, to have an explicit connection to interstate commerce.75 The Gun-Free
School Zones Act, noted the Court, seeks to regulate all gun possession in schools,
without any attempt to limit its reach through the inclusion of a jurisdictional
element to only that gun possession which affects interstate commerce.76
Included in the majority's reasoning was the conclusion that there were no
congressional findings or legislative history that demonstrated any legislative
judgment that the possession of firearms in school zones substantially affects
interstate commerce.' The Court, however, noted that such findings are not
required but only useful in the exercise of judicial review."
Emphasizing the result of a lack of limits on federal power, Rehnquist rejected
the Government's argument that violent crime resulting from gun possession within
school zones substantially affects interstate commerce by imposing increased
interstate costs?9 The Court also rejected the government's argument that the
Rehnquist wrote,
[The Act] is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms .... It
cannot... be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.
Id. at 1630-31.
73. 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of the purely intrastate production
of wheat because, taken in the aggregate, wheat supply and demand affects interstate commerce).
74. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
75. See United Stzies v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 351 (1971) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which
criminalized receiving, possessing, or transporting any firearm in commerce or affecting commerce, to
require a nexus to interstate commerce and, thus, placing the statute under Commerce Clause power).
76. Rehnquist wrote, "[The Gun-Free School Zones Act] has no express jurisdictional element which
might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
77. The Court refused to import congressional findings from other laws as evidence of legislative
judgment in regard to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Likewise, the Court refused to use congressional
findings on the effects of firearm possession on interstate and foreign commerce which were added to
the Gun-Free School Zones Act by amendment. See The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 § 320904 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (1994). The amendment came
subsequent to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
was beyond the power of the federal government under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit cited
the lack of congressional findings concerning the Gun-Free School Zones Act as important to their
decision. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
78. The Court, said Rehnquist, was left to consider Lopez absent any guidance by way of actual
legislative judgment. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
79. The Government specifically cited increased national insurance rates and the discouragement
of interstate travel to unsafe areas. Rehnquist responded "[ulnder its 'costs of crime' reasoning ...
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,




national economy would suffer from the deterioration in quality of education as a
result of the presence of violent weapons in schools."0 Rehnquist cautioned that if
the Court were to analyze the case as the Government suggested, federal power
would be made limitless and federalism obsolete."'
Finally, while admitting that the analysis used by the Court in reaching its
holding was necessarily one of degree and not kind,' the Court concluded that
firearm possession in schools fell beyond the regulatory power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause.' Incorporating language from throughout
the opinion, Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he possession of a gun in a local school
zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."'4
D. The Kennedy Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the opinion of the
Court. After giving an overview of the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Kennedy observed that past decisions made clear at least two reasons for great
caution in -overturning a federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. First,
Kennedy warned about the "imprecision of content-based boundaries used ... to
define the limits of the Commerce Clause."' Second, Kennedy cautioned about
ignoring stare decisis in an area where "the Court as an institution and the legal
system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence."'
Kennedy argued that among the structural elements of the Constitution, federalism
has presented the most difficult challenge as a subject of judicial review."'
Kennedy noted the role of the political branches of government in preserving
federalism but cautioned against complete judicial abdication in that regard.'
80. Rehnquist again looked to the elasticity of such an approach, stating "under the Government's
'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the
economic productivity of individual citizens." Id.
81. In what may be an important indication of future decisions, Rehnquist warned that this approach
would result in federal power extending "even [to] areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign." Id. Family law was also cited by Rehnquist as a
recognized area of state sovereignty. Id.
82. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
83. Id. at 1634.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1637-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Kennedy wrote,
[The absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials to undertake this
principled task, and the momentary political convenience often attendant upon their failure
to do so, argue against a complete renunciation of the judicial role. Although it is the
obligation of all officers of the Government to respect the constitutional design, the
federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a
role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level
of Government has tipped the scales too far.
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Kennedy admitted, however, that the "substantial element of political judgment"
necessary to Commerce Clause decisions has made it extraordinarily difficult for the
Court to establish principles in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence."
Kennedy argued that a federal statute which contained no evident commercial
nexus should trigger an inquiry as to whether the federal government was seeking
to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern. 0 Kennedy found that such an
intrusion occurred with the Gun-Free School Zones Act." Arguing for the utility
of state sovereignty in regulating gun possession in schools, Kennedy cited the
ability of the states to act as laboratories for experimentation and the sufficiency of
state powers to deal with instances of gun possession in schools.'
Kennedy concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act represented a significant
intrusion on state sovereignty and an insufficient connection to the "commercial
concerns" of the Commerce Clause. 3 Kennedy concluded that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act interfered with the balance of state and federal power to such a degree
that the Court must hold the Act beyond the power of the federal government under
the Commerce Clause.94
E. The Thomas Concurrence
In Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, Thomas articulated his desire to reconsider
the substantial effects test in favor of a test more in line with the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause." Thomas argued that the original
understanding of Commerce Clause power did not include the extension of federal
power to all activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.' Under the
original understanding, according to Thomas, "commerce" meant trade - that is,
selling, buying, or bartering - and not production-related activities such as
manufacturing or agriculture. 7
Rejecting Justice Breyer's analysis of prior case law, Thomas analyzed Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as consistently maintaining the federalist principle of division
of power between state and federal governments." Thomas concluded that the all-
inclusive substantial effects test should be abandoned," but admitted that stare
Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
89. Kennedy stated, "The substantial element of political judgment in Commerce Clause matters
leaves our institutional capacity to intervene... in doubt." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1642 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Id at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Id at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97. Id at 1643 (Th3mas, J., concurring).
98. Id at 164649 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Of the substantal effects test, Thomas wrote, "Such a formulation of federal power is no test




decisis may prevent a complete return to the original understanding of Commerce
Clause power."
F. The Stevens Dissent
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Commerce
Clause power includes the power to regulate firearms at any location because of
their "potentially harmful use" and the subsequent effect on interstate commerce.''
Therefore, according to Stevens, Congress must also have the power to regulate
firearm possession in particular markets, including school zones."
G. The Souter Dissent
Justice Souter, in a separate dissenting opinion, offered a clear defense of the
rational basis test as the proper method for judicial review of Commerce Clause
power. Souter analyzed Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the standpoint of
the judicial function, associating the excesses and ineffectiveness of judicial
review of Commerce Clause cases in the early twentieth century with the
discredited Lochnert3 line of decisions of that same period. 4 The primary
lesson of this "chastening"'0 5 era, according to Souter, is the unsuitability of the
judiciary, rather than the legislature, to decide which activities are interstate
commerce and which are not. It was this very unsuitability, said Souter, that
led the Court to abandon the "formalistic"' 7 distinctions that had been used to
place limits on Commerce Clause power and adopt instead the rational basis test
and its inherent deference to the legislature.
The majority's holding, according to Souter, adopted commerciality as a
"qualification"'"4 to the rational basis test."' Souter warned that the evaluation
of what is commercial and what is not would send the Court into the same
100. Id. at 1650 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. The Court, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that a state statute which
set maximum hours for employees was unconstitutional because the law violated the due process
guarantee of liberty of contract), and other similar decisions, struck down a variety of social and
economic legislation on the grounds that the laws violated substantive due process.
104. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1652-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1652-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Souter wrote,
The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative judgments ... reflects our respect
for the institutional competence of the Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by
the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's
political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible choices.
Id. at 1651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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analytical abyss of economic policy making that the Court experienced sixty years
ago."'
Souter cautioned against any future use of traditional state sovereignty as an
exception or qualification to rational basis review. Souter rejected the argument that
the connection between interstate commerce and activities subject to traditional state
sovereignty is in and of itself remote."'
Souter concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act passed the rational basis
test". and the majority holding in Lopez should be seen only as a "misstep.
'" 4
But, Souter warned, "not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings. W1
5
H. The Breyer Dissent
Justice Breyer. joined by the three other dissenting justices, 6 wrote that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act falls well within the federal Commerce Clause
power."7 Breyer argued for three principles of Commerce Clause interpretation
in analyzing Lopez, First, the Commerce Clause power includes the power to
regulate local activities insofar as they significantly affect interstate commerce."
Second, the Court should consider the cumulative effect of all similar activities
when determining whether the activity in question significantly affects interstate
commerce."9 Third, the Court should judge the connection between an activity and
interstate commerce "not directly, but at one remove."'2 In other words, the Court
should only judge whether the legislature could rationally decide that the activity,
taken in totality, significantly affects interstate commerce.
As an additional point of analysis, Breyer argued that formal congressional
findings should not be required in cases of rational basis review of Commerce
111. Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112. Souter wrote,
As for remoteness, it may or may not be wise for the National Government to deal with
education, but Justice Brayer has surely demonstrated that the commercial prospects of
an illiterate State ar Nation are not rosy, and no argument should be needed to show that
hijacking interstate shipments of cigarettes can affect commerce substantially even though
the States have traditionally prosecuted robbery.
Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also made light of the notion that the Commerce Clause
becomes "weaker," as Souter characterized the argument, where it touches activities subject to traditional
state sovereignty. It is well settled, Souter responded, that the Commerce Clause power is plenary and
therefore must either coexist with a particular police power of a state or preempt that power. Id. at 1654-
55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. Souter stated "The only question is whether the legislative judgment is within the realm of
reason," Id. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
117. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. "I use the word 'significant' because the word 'substantial' implies a somewhat narrower power
than recent precedent suggests. But, to speak of 'substantial effect' rather than 'significant effect' would
make no difference in this case." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 1658 (Brayer, J., dissenting).




Clause power. To do so, Breyer stated, "would appear to elevate form over
substance.'''
Analyzing whether regulation of gun possession in school zones could rational-
ly be considered by the legislature to significantly - or, per the majority,
substantially - affect interstate commerce, Breyer cited a long list of reports and
studies in support of the position that such an effect could be found. The various
documents listed by Breyer told of the influence of gun possession and violent
crime on the quality of education and the influence of the quality of education on
the national economy."
Breyer rejected the majority's argument that holding gun possession in school
zones to be a proper subject of federal regulation would destroy federalism and
obliterate the line between what is federal and what is local." Breyer cautioned
that the majority opinion created three important legal problems. First, activities
with less connection to interstate commerce than evident in Lopez, according to
Breyer, have been held to be within the federal government's Commerce Clause
power." Second, the majority's distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial activities is a revival of the use of discredited "technical legal conceptions,"
rather than a "practical" understanding of economics to decide the level of effect an
activity has on interstate commerce." Third, the majority's holding could cause
legal uncertainty in what had been a settled point of law, inspiring needless
litigation and bringing into question numerous federal statues written to comply with
the settled understanding of Commerce Clause power."
L Rehnquist's Response to the Breyer Dissent
Much of Rehnquist's opinion responded to the arguments made by Justice Breyer
in his dissenting opinion. Rehnquist argued that under the analysis used by Breyer,
the federal government's Commerce Clause power would be tantamount to a federal
121. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. As evidence of the substantial effect of education on the national economy, Justice Breyer
cited - among many others - articles detailing the financial rewards of investing in human capital,
the increasing global competition, and the use of the level of education of the workforce as a criterion
for corporate location decisions. Id. at 1665-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Breyer wrote,
A holding that the particular statute before us falls within the commerce power would not
expand the scope of that Clause. Rather, it simply would apply preexisting law to
changing economic circumstances. It would recognize that, in today's economic world,
gun-related violence near the classroom makes a significant difference to our economic,
as well as our social, well-being.
Id. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. I11 (1942)).
125. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 398 (1905) (Holmes, J.)).
126. Id. at 1664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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police power, subject to no intrinsic or extrinsic limits other than the rights
preserved to individuals.'"
Rehnquist criticized the elasticity of Breyer's approach, arguing that it would
result in judicial approval of any federal regulation." Rehnquist theorized that the
reasoning which would allow federal regulation of firearms in schools because of
the adverse effect on classroom learning would apply equally to direct federal
regulation of the entire educational process, including specific school curricula.'29
Rehnquist sharply rejected Breyer's assertion that "Congress... could rationally
conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line."'3 0 Rehnquist
explained that the level of generality needed to support this conclusion would
subvert any real limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause.
Perhaps the clearest articulation of the underlying rationale of the majority's
holding in Lopez came in response to Breyer's charge that the decision would only
create legal uncertainty. Rehnquist argued that such uncertainty is better than the
alternative of the judicial branch complicitly allowing Congress to seize a plenary
police power that reaches far beyond the limits imposed on that body in the
Constitution.' Rehnquist wrote, "So long as Congress' authority is limited to
those powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional
legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender 'legal uncertainty."'" 2
The need for the judiciary to impose limits on federal power is so important,
according to Rehnquist, that it overrides many concerns regarding the elegance of
method.
IV. The Ramifications of United States v. Lopez
Although it remains too early to gauge the true impact of Lopez, early Commerce
Clause jurisprudence points to less significance than anticipated by most commen-
tators. In the words of Justice Souter, Lopez does indeed seem to be more "misstep"
than "epoch."''
A. The New Federalism
Certainly there is reason to believe that a judicial curtailment of federal
Commerce Clause power would resonate throughout the decisions of the federal
bench. Calls for greater state sovereignty have in recent times been loudly
trumpeted in both tlie judicial and political arenas." Judges and politicians alike
127. Id. at 1632.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1633.
130. Id. (quoting id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
131. Ld.
132. 1&
133. Id. at 1657.
134. The diminishment of federal regulations has been an oft-repeated principle in the ideology
of many political officials in recent times. As this issue has been mostly - but by no means




have spoken out for less federal "interference" in the affairs of the states, premising
their arguments on the view that the ever-encroaching power of federal government
is suffocating state's rights and making state responsibility useless.
The theme of federalism figured prominently in the 1995 and 1996 terms of the
Supreme Court, not only in Lopez but also in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton"'
and Seminole Tribe v. Florida.'36 In Term Limits, the Court held that states cannot
add to the qualifications to be a Member of Congress."3 The debate in Term
Limits revolved around competing theories of sovereignty, with Justice Stevens -
for the majority - interpreting the base of power of federal officials as national
popular sovereignty 3' and Justice Thomas - in his dissent - arguing for state
sovereignty.'39 In Seminole, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act,"0 which authorized a tribe to bring suit in federal court
to compel a state to negotiate with the tribe in order to arrive at a compact between
the tribe and the state regarding the regulation of certain gaming activities. The
Court held that the Indian Commerce Clause"' does not grant Congress the power
to infringe upon state sovereignty by abrogating a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in federal court."' Thus, under Seminole, a tribe cannot sue
a state in federal court to force negotiations pursuant to the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act."3 What is most clear from these cases is that the nuances of the
for the future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the number of federal judges appointed during the
years of that party's control of the White House. As of January 1, 1995, fully 393 of the 645 active
federal district judges and 103 of the 167 active Court of Appeals judges were appointed under
Republican administrations. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm
Examination, JUDICATURE, May-June 1995, at 291. History, however, cautions against reading too
much into the source of political appointments of judges as a means of forecasting their decisions.
135. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
136. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
137. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1852.
138. Justice Stevens wrote, "Thus the Framers, in perhaps their most important contribution,
conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over
the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people." Id. at 1868.
139. Justice Thomas countered,,
In short, the notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the Constitution does not erase
state boundaries, but rather tracks them. The people of each State obviously did trust their
fate to the people of the several States when they consented to the Constitution; not only
did they empower the governmental institutions of the United States, but they also agreed
to be bound by constitutional amendments that they themselves refused to ratify .... At
the same time, however, the people of each State retained their separate political identities.
As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[n]o political dreamer was ever wild enough to think
of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American
people into one common mass."
Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1918)).
140. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
141. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
142. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996).
143. As with the progeny of Lopez, lower courts have not read Seminole to significantly undermine
the extent of federal power authorized by the Indian Commerce Clause. See United States v.
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division of state and federal power will likely occupy the Court's attention for some
time.
B. Early Developments
The early progeny of Lopez have not borne out the forecasts of radical change
made by early prognosticators.'" It would be inaccurate, however, to say that the
effects of Lopez have not been, nor will not be, important. At minimum, federal
Commerce Clause authority has become a legitimate subject of judicial review,
rather than a mere formality." 5 Because the Commerce Clause covers an extraor-
dinarily wide field of action, it will be a number of years before an accurate
assessment of the impact of this change can be made.
1. Federal Criminal Statutes
At least one hope for Lopez was that the Supreme Court's decision would reverse
the increasing federalization of criminal law.'" That has not proved to be the
result. To date, no federal criminal statute has been ruled unconstitutional in light
of Lopez.
Federal statutes regulating firearms have been repeatedly challenged since the
announcement of L9pez, all to no avail. Post-Lopez decisions have upheld federal
statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms by a felon;"7 the importing,
Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142, 146 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994), to be within the federal governmentfs power under the Indian Commerce Clause), cert. denied,
No. 96-5786, 1996 WL 514256 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996).
144. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judging with Pinpoint Accuracy, THE RECORDER, May 8, 1995, at 10
(quoting Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman's description of Lopez as "one of the opening cannonades
in the coming constitutional revolution"). But cf Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV.
674 (1995) (forecasting that the Supreme Court is unlikely to expand Lopez by building upon its
principles or striking down other congressional statutes).
145. See Frank J. Murray, Commerce Ruling Increases Appeals, Court Undercuts Some Federal
Laws, WASHINGTON TInIES, Sept. 25, 1995, at A4.
146. See generally Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on
Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 KAN. L. REv. 503 (1995).
147. Federal prohibition of the possession by a felon of a firearm that has travelled in interstate
corhmerce, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994), has been upheld as a proper exercise of federal Commerce Clause
power by courts of appeals in every circuit to consider the issue. See United States v. Abernathy, 83 F.3d
17 (1st Cir. 1996); Unitel States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40 (Ist Cir. 1996); United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d
57 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Gateward,
84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-5709, 1996 WL 496246 (U.S. Oct, 7, 1996); United
States v. Clontz, No. 95-5550, 1996 WL 537097 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996); United States v. Mobley, No.
95-5416, 1996 WL 1386.74 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 1996); United States v. Hinton, No. 95-5095, 1995 WL
623876 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1026 (1996); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d
240 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Murphy, No. 95-3729, 1996 WL 546865 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1996);
United States v. Chesnev, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887 (6th Cir.
1996); United States v. Bradford, 78 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1581 (1996); United
States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5184); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th
Cir. 1995) (per curian), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1364 (1996); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th




manufacturing, or dealing in firearms by unlicensed persons;" the possession of
a firearm with an obliterated serial number;'49 the unlawful manufacture of a
firearm; s" the possession of a handgun by a juvenile; the possession of a
firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime; and the transfer or posses-
sion of machine guns."3 In each case, courts distinguished the firearms statutes
from the Gun-Free School Zones Act by noting the express -jurisdictional
requirement in each firearms statute that the firearm have some nexus to interstate
commerce." Such a requirement, as noted by the majority in Lopez, was absent
States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996); United States v.
McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (1lth Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994), which prohibits the possession of an unregistered destructive device
or silencer, to be a proper exercise of federal Commerce Clause power); United States v. Dodge, 61 F.3d
142 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 428 (1995); United States v. Folen, 84 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1994), which prohibits the possession by felons of explosives that
have travelled in interstate commerce, to be within federal Commerce Clause power); United States v.
Snow, 82 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (1994), which prohibits the theft of a
firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer, to be within federal Commerce Clause power); United
States v. Miller, 74 F.3d 159 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1994); see United States v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Conn. 1995).
149. See United States v. Hemandez, 85 F.3d 1023 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)
(1994), which prohibits the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, to be a proper
exercise of federal Commerce Clause power because of the express requirement that the firearm have
moved in interstate commerce); United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946 (1st Cir. 1995) (same).
150. See United States v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f) (1994),
which prohibits the unlawful manufacture of a firearm, to be within federal Commerce Clause power).
151. See United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)
(1994), which prohibits the knowing possession of a handgun by a juvenile, to be within federal
Commerce Clause power).
152. Courts of appeals in four circuits have held that the enhancement of criminal sentences for the
possession of a firearm in connection with an underlying drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(1994), is within federal Commerce Clause authority because of the effect of the underlying activity of
drug trafficking on interstate commerce. See United States v. Walker, No. 95-5223, 1996 WL 414302,
(4th Cir. July 25, 1996); United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown, 72
F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 95-5792, 1996 WL 514273 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996); United States v. Bolton,
68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996); United States v. Carolina, No. 94-
6439, 1995 WL 422862 (10th Cir. July 19, 1995).
153. Courts of appeals in five circuits have held that the prohibition of possession of a machine gun,
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994), is within federal Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d
791 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc granted, 78 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beuckelaere,
91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Copus, 93 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
65 U.S.L.W. 3233 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1976); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir.
1995).
154. But see United States v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996), which upheld the
prohibition of the disposal of a firearm to a convicted felon as within federal Commerce Clause power
despite the statute's lack of a jurisdictional element which limits its scope to those offenses affecting
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1994). The Monteleone court found that the statute was within
federal Commerce Clause authority because of the commercial nature of the activity regulated.
Monteleone, 77 F.3d at 1092.
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in the Gun-Free School Zones Act. 5
Other federal crimes have also been upheld as proper exercises of federal
Commerce Clause power, even in light of Lopez. Federal regulation of drug
trafficking has been held to be authorized by the Commerce Clause, based on the
distinction from Lopez that drug trafficking is a commercial or economic activity
which substantially affects interstate commerce." Similar "economic activity"
reasoning has been used to uphold federal prohibition of the distribution of
controlled substances in school zones," carjacking,"58 money laundering,'59 and
RICO statutes (use of income gained through racketeering on enterprises or
activities affecting interstate commerce).16'
Courts of appeals have unanimously upheld the facial constitutionality of the
federal prohibition against arson of property used in interstate commerce. 16 A split
155. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
156. Courts of app.rals in five circuits have held that the prohibition of drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1994), is within federal Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d
582 (Ist Cir. 1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d
318 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert, denied, 116
S. Ct.-2581 (1996); United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wacker, 72
F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 18
U.S.C. § 846 (1994), w'hich prohibits the conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, to be within
federal Commerce Clau.3e power); United States v. Morris, 94 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); United
States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
157. See United States v. Zorrilla, 93 F.3d 7 (Ist Cir. 1996) (holding 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994),
which allows the enhancement of criminal sentences where an underlying crime of manufacture or
possession of controlled substances takes place within 1000 feet of a school zone, to be within federal
Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States
v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1432 (1996); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995)
(same); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995) (same).
158. Courts of apprals in seven circuits have held that the prohibition of "carjacking," 18 U.S.C.
§ 2119 (1994), is within federal Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995); United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 32,53 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5304); United States v. McHenry, No. 95-3638,
1996 WL 554551 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1996); United States v. Green, No. 94-6215, 1995 WL 451782 (6th
Cir. July 27, 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 543 (1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234 (8th Cir.
1995); United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th
Cir. 1995); United State:- v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 749 (1996);
United States v. Carolira, No. 94-6439, 1995 WL 422862 (10th Cir. July 19, 1995); United States v.
Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-5397, 1996 WL 442546 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1996); United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 258 (1995).
159. See United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1994),
which prohibits money Taundering, to be within federal Commerce Clause authority), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1571 (1996); see also United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-
5771. 1996 WL 514200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (rejecting Lopez challenge to a conviction under money
laundering and RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) (1994), premised
on an underlying state prostitution offense which involved the use of facilities of interstate commerce).
160. See United States v. Torres, No. S2 94 CR. 466 (JFK), 1995 WL 459247 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,
1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994), the RICO statutes, to be within federal Commerce Clause
authority because of the economic nature of the prohibited activities).




has developed, however, in regard to the jurisdictional question of whether Lopez
alters the degree of effect on interstate commerce that must be present in order to
allow prosecution under the federal arson act." Both the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have required a greater nexus to interstate commerce in light of Lopez.63
The Eighth Circuit has rejected the argument that Lopez redefines the jurisdictional
element of the arson act's required effect on interstate commerce.'
A similar question has been raised as to the effect on interstate commerce
necessary to support a violation of the Hobbs Act," which prohibits interference
with commerce by robbery or extortion. The great majority of courts to consider the
issue have ruled that Lopez does not alter the degree of effect on interstate
commerce required to state a claim for violation of the act." At least one district
court, however, has held that the government, in order to satisfy the jurisdictional
element of the Hobbs Act, must show that the conduct of the accused had a
substantial rather than merely a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.67
2. Federal Civil Statutes
Another predicted area of diminished federal power as a result, of Lopez is the
federal government's regulation of noncriminal intrastate activities. Here, more than
in federal regulation of crimes or firearms, the principles articulated in Lopez show
a few, limited signs of influencing the decisions of lower courts regarding the limits
of federal power. Nonetheless, most post-Lopez decisions in this area have endorsed
(1994), which prohibits arson of a building used in interstate commerce, to be within federal Commerce
Clause authority because of the economic nature of the activity and the required nexus between the
activity and interstate commerce); United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United
States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 1996)
(same); United States v. Shedin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795
(1996).
162. See generally Thomas J. Egan, Note, The Jurisdictional Element of 18 U.S.C § 844(i), A
Federal Criminal Commerce Clause Statute, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 183 (1995).
163. See United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 330-31 (11th Cir.) (holding, in light of Lopez, that
the occasional use of a home computer for a business purpose does not represent a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce to allow prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)), amended in part on reh'g,
90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(holding, in light of Lopez, that the receipt of natural gas from an out-of-state source does not represent
a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to allow prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
164. See United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1398 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the arson
of a rent house which received out-of-state utilities represents a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce
to allow prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
166. See United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the argument that Lopez
requires more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994)); United States v. Bruce, 78 F.3d 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) (same),
cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-9389); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836
(8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2570 (1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir.
1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995)
(same).
167. See United States v. Woodruff, No. CR-93-0438-VRW, 1996 WL 481565 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
1996).
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federal regulation as within Commerce Clause authority. Courts have upheld the
constitutional authority of, among other civil statutes, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA),"' the National Labor Relations Act,"6 the Beef
Promotion and Research Act, 7' and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act."'
To date, the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to prison work assignments,
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Violence Against
Women Act, and the Child Support Recovery Act have been ruled unconstitutional
by a lower court as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez.
a) The Americans with Disabilities Act
In Pierce v. King, a North Carolina district court held that Congress lacks the
authority under the Commerce Clause to apply the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). to prison work assignments. The district court ruled that a state inmate
displeased with his prison work assignment does not have a valid cause of action
for accommodation under the ADA because that Act's reach is limited by the
Commerce Clause." The Pierce court looked to the insufficiency of the effect of
the administration of state prisons on interstate commerce and the traditional
sovereignty of states over their own prisons."
In Abbott v. Bragdon,"7' however, a federal district court in Maine rejected a
Lopez challenge to Title III of the ADA.'7 The ADA prohibits discrimination in
the full and equal enjoyment of services by places of public accommodation on the
basis of disability."7 The Abbott court held that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, may forbid the denial of dental service by a private clinic to a patient who
is HIV positive.'78 The Abbott court, citing Wickard,7 held that dental service,
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce and is therefore subject
to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.m
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); see Cannon v. Group Health Serv., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-1927).
169. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(1), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994): see
Aroostook County Reg onal Opthamology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
170. 7 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994); see Goetz v. Glickman, 920 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Kan. 1996).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994); see Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the constitutionality of the RFRA is not affected by Lopez because the RFRA was enacted
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
172. 918 F. Supp. 932, 938 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 939.
175. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182 (1994).
177. Id.
178. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 591.
179. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of the purely intrastate
production of wheat because of the aggregate effect of wheat supply and demand on interstate
commerce).




b) The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
Courts of appeals in four circuits have held the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (FACE), 8 l which regulates interference with access to abortion
clinics, to be within the power of the federal government under the Commerce
Clause.' In Cheffer v. Reno," the 11th Circuit distinguished the FACE from
the Gun-Free School Zones Act on the basis of the commercial nature of the
provision of reproductive health services." 4 Further, the Cheffer court held that the
congressional findings, the interstate movement of doctors, patients, and supplies,
and the threat to interstate commerce by the violent and physical obstruction of
abortion clinic entrances all support a holding that provision of reproductive health
services substantially affects interstate commerce.' On these grounds, the Cheffer
court found the FACE to be a proper subject of federal Commerce Clause
authority."
A lone federal district court has taken exception to the above decisions, instead
ruling that the FACE is unconstitutional as beyond the federal government's power
under the Commerce Clause. In Hoffman v. Hunt,"7 the distict court rejected
congressional findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Hoffman
court compared those findings to the government's arguments rejected in Lopez,
stating that any connection between access to abortion clinic entrances and interstate
commerce is too tenuous to justify Congress' conversion of a state crime into a
federal offense.8 '
Again citing Lopez, the Hoffman court held that the FACE lacked a jurisdictional
element which would limit the Act's reach to a discrete set of activities which affect
interstate commerce." Further, the Hoffman court determined that the activity
which the FACE sought to regulate was not the provision or sale of reproductive
health services but the civil protest of such services."' Based on this distinction,
181. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
182. See United States v. Sodema, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act to be within federal Commerce Clause power), petition for cert. filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. Jul. 26, 1996) (No. 96-141); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.
1996) (same), petition for cert. filed, No. 96-5615 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1996); American Life League, Inc. v.
Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d
675 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Lucero v.
Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (same); United States v. Scott, 919 F. Supp. 76 (D. Conn.
1996) (same); United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); and United States v.
White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1432-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
183. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
184. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520.
185. Id. at 1520-21.
186. Id.
187. 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996). A federal district court in Wisconsin agreed with Hoffman,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Wilson, 880 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
188. Hoffman, 923 F. Supp. at 807.
189. Id. at 817.
190. Id. at 809.
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the Hoffrnan court held that the FACE does not regulate an activity that is
commercial or economic in nature, because civil protest is not commerce,"' and
rejected arguments regarding the interstate movement of doctors, patients, and
supplies, because only the movement of the protesters would be relevant."
c) CERCLA
A federal district court in Alabama has held that Lopez prevents the application
of liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)" to the clean-up of hazardot~s waste after the facility in
question is no longer operating.'" In United States v. Olin Corp., the district court
found that the activity sought to be regulated was the after the fact clean-up of real
property, an issue of local real property law and, thus, properly subject to state
sovereignty. 95 Echoing Lopez, the Olin court held that such clean-up was not
economic or commercial in nature and bore no substantial effect on interstate
commerce." Moreover, the Olin court found that CERCLA contains no jurisdic-
tional element which limits its reach to a discrete set of activities which affect
interstate commerce." The Olin court' ruled that in such circumstances the
application of CERCLA is beyond the power of the federal government under the
Commerce Clause."'
The two other district courts to consider the issue disagreed with Olin.lw In
Cooper Industries v. Agway, a district court in New York held that the imposition
of CERCLA liability for clean-up of an inactive site is a proper exercise of federal
Commerce Clause power.' As a matter of dicta, the Cooper court found that the
clean-up of hazardous waste does have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
specifically disagreeing with the arguments in Olin to the contrary.'' The
principal holding of the court, however, was that CERCLA is subject to federal
Commerce Clause authority because CERCLA falls under the second category of
permissible federal regulation articulated in Lopez, specifically the regulation and
protection of instrumentalities of interstate commerce.2" The Cooper court
observed that a priority of CERCLA regarding the clean-up of hazardous waste is
the protection of ground water resources from contamination and held that such
191. Id. at 814.
192. Id. at 807-08.
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
194. United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1533 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
195. Id. at 1532-33.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1533.
198. Id.
199. See Cooper Indus. v. Agway, No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL 550128 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996)
(holding application of CERCLA liability to be within federal Commerce Clause power); United States
v. NL Industries, No. .91-CV-578-JLF, 1996 WL 480724 (S.D. II!. Aug. 22, 1996) (same).
200. Cooper, 1996 WL 550128, at *11.
201. Id.




resources are, in fact, an instrumentality of interstate commerce.m On this basis,
the Cooper court held that it is a proper use of federal Commerce Clause power to
protect ground water from pollution, even if the threat of pollution is from a purely
intrastate source.'
d) The Violence Against Women Act
The two district courts that have considered the constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), which establishes a federal civil right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender and provides civil remedies for
violations of that right, have split on the issue of whether the VAWA is authorized
by federal Commerce Clause authority. In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and
State University.' the VAWA was held to exceed the power of the federal
government under the Commerce Clause. Comparing the VAWA to the Gun-
Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez, the Brzonkala court cited four reasons
for holding the VAWA unconstitutional: (1) the VAWA seeks to regulate local
criminal activity which is not economic or commercial in nature;' (2) the VAWA
does not contain a jurisdictional element which limits its scope to activities which
affect interstate commerce;2' (3) permitting federal regulation under the VAWA
would have the practical result of "excessively extending" the power of the federal
government at the expense of that of the states;' and (4) congressional findings
predicating the VAWA only demonstrate that violence against women affects the
national economy, but do not establish that such violence substantially affects
interstate commerce.10
A district court in Connecticut, however, held that the VAWA's establishment of
a federal civil right to be free from crimes of gender motivated violence is a proper
exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause.2 ' In Doe v. Doe, the
district court rejected the argument that the VAWA federalizes state criminal,
family, and tort law.1 The VAWA, stated the Doe court, merely complements
those laws and does not preclude their use."3 The Doe court held that congres-
sional findings regarding the VAWA show that gender based violence "qualitatively
and quantitatively" has a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Finally, the
Doe court, citing Wickard,225 held that the aggregate nationwide impact of
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. No. 95-1358-R, 1996 WL 431097 (W.D. Va. July 26, 1996).
206. Id. at *15.
207. Id. at *13.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *14.
210. Id.
211. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
212. Id. at 610.
213. Id. at 616.
214. Id. at 613-14.
215. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11I, 128 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of the purely
intrastate production of wheat because of the aggregate effect of wheat supply and demand on interstate
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diminished participation by women in the workforce or marketplace caused by the
threat or actuality of gender based violence substantially affects interstate
commerce.
216
e) The Child Support Recovery Act
Perhaps the most prominent post-Lopez debate concerning the constitutionality of
a federal civil statute is that over the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA).2 7 To
date, the CSRA, which prohibits willful nonpayment of child support where the
obligor and child are in different states, has been challenged on Lopez principles in
three courts of appeals and fourteen federal district courts. All three courts of
appeals and all but' three federal district courts held that the CSRA is a proper
exercise of federal Commerce Clause power28
The debate over the CSRA can perhaps be best illustrated by considering United
States v. Mussari," in which a federal district court in Arizona dismissed an
indictment for failure to pay over $40,000 in child support after holding that the
CSRA is not authorized by the Commerce Clause." That decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held the CSRA to be within
federal power under the Commerce Clause." x
The Ninth Circuit held that the obligation created by nonpayment of child support
where the obligor and child are in different states is an instrumentality of interstate
commerce.' As such, observed that court, the obligation to pay child support falls
under the second category of permissible federal regulation articulated by Justice
Rehnquist in Lopez - the protection of instrumentalities of interstate commerce -
and is not subject to the same substantial effects analysis that was used in
considering the Gun-Free School Zones Act. As an instrumentality of interstate
commerce).
216. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
217. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
218. Holding the CSRA to be within the federal government's Commerce Clause power are: United
States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996). affirming 892 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United
States v. Mussari, 95 F,3d 787 (9th Cir 1996), reversing 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995); United
States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), affirming 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995); United States
v. Lewis, No. CR. 95-076 P., 1996 WL 511584 (D.R.I. Sept. 5, 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930
F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United
States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); United States v. Sims, No. 95-CR-125-H, 1996 WL 494855 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 22, 1996);
United States v. Bongiorno, No. 94-10178-REK, 1996 WL 208508 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 1996); United
States v. Hopper, 899 F Supp. 389 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D.
Va. 1995), judgment vacated, 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996) (finding lack of venue).
Holding the CSRA to be beyond the federal Commerce Clause power are: United States v. Parker,
911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995). See also
United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
220. Id. at 1367.
221. United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), reversing 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz,
1995).




commerce, the obligation to pay child support is regulatable by Congress even
where the impediment.to payment is purely intrastate.m
The district court in Mussari had held that, under Lopez, a proper analysis of the
CSRA required the determination of whether the activity sought to be regulated has
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The district court cited four reasons for
finding the CSRA to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power: (1) the
noneconomic nature of the nonpayment of child support; (2) the lack of a
jurisdictional requirement in the CSRA of a nexus between nonpayment of child
support and interstate commerce; (3) the lack of legislative findings that the
nonpayment of child support is a matter of interstate commerce; and (4) general
notions of federalism and comity.
Characterizing the CSRA as a criminal - rather than a commercial or eco-
nomic - statute, the district court in Mussari held that nonpayment of child
support does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' 4 The district
court in United States v. Sage,2" however, which held the CSRA to be
constitutional, argued that nonpayment of child support is economic in a way that
gun possession in a school zone is not. To wit, there is an economic gain by the
obligor and an economic loss by the obligee.'
Echoing Lopez, the district court in Mussari held that the CSRA lacked the
jurisdictional requirement of a nexus between nonpayment of child support and
interstate commerce.' The district court in Mussari held that the CSRA's
requirement that parent and child live in different states is not sufficient to establish
an interstate nexus because, first, the CSRA applies equally where parents or
children have moved out of state and, second, such a connection is so tenuous that,
if allowed, it would result in unlimited congressional power.' The Ninth Circuit,
however, countered that it made no difference whether the interstate character of the
offense was created by the parent or child, so long as it exists.'
The legislative history of the CSRA, argued the district court in Mussari, contains
no findings demonstrating a substantial effect on interstate commerce by non-
payment of child support. According to that court, the congressional findings merely
show that nonpayment of child support is a national problem, not a matter of
national commerce."0 The district court in Mussari rejected the argument that
federal regulation is authorized simply because state action is ineffective or
interstate extradition difficult." Other courts considering the issue have disagreed,
holding that congressional findings, speaking to the poverty level of obligees and
the inability of individual states to effectively collect interstate child support, amply
223. Id. at 789-90.
224. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363.
225. 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
226. Id. at 86-87.
227. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
228. Id.
229. Mussari, 95 F.3d at 790.
230. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1366.
231. Id.
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demonstrate a substantial effect of nonpayment of child support on interstate
commerce.2
2
Finally, the district court in Mussari held that federalism and comity support a
decision disallowing a federal criminal and family law statute, which traditionally
would have been subject to state sovereignty. 3 The district court argued that
actual application of the CSRA would force federal courts to review and apply state
child support orders, a clear intrusion into domestic relations issues.' The Ninth
Circuit specifically rejected this analysis, holding that federalism and comity would
at most only require a federal court to delay action until a state court has ruled on
a support order."5
V. A Few Brief Suggestions on the Methods of
Judicial Review of the Balance of State and Federal Power
The broad range of activities at issue, and the interconnectedness of those
activities in the modern world, have ensured that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
be filled with subtlety and complexity. It is an area where the language of decisions
has often become strained and obscure in the attempt to find principle for future
guidance. But at its heart is a question of judicial review: What is the Supreme
Court's role - and what role is the Supreme Court capable of - in determining the
balance of state and federal power by defining the limits of Commerce Clause
authority?
A. Criticism of the Lopez Opinions
Consistent throughout the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
controversy regarding judicial review of the balance of state and federal power. The
difficulty stems from this conflict: Judicial review of Commerce Clause power
requires the judiciary to inquire into and make decisions about economic policy, but
complete deference to the legislature removes all checks - save democracy - on
the federal government's augmentation of its own power. On the one hand, the
judiciary cannot review the effect of an activity on interstate commerce without
making itself into an unrestrained superlegislature. On the other, the legislature
should not be relied on for principled self-restraint exclusive of any check on the
constant temptation to increase its own power.
Rehnquist, in Lopez, fails to define a principled standard for judicial review of
Commerce Clause authority. Rehnquist's claim that Lopez represents no change in
232. See United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 87-88 (D. Conn. 1995), affid, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995), affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir. 1996).
233. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1367. Because of its ruling that the CSRA is not rooted in any
enumerated power, the Mussari court held that the CSRA violated the Tenth Amendment's reservation
of power to the states. Id. at 1367-68. The Mussari court's use of the Tenth Amendment did not,
however, rise to the level of interpreting the Tenth Amendment to be, in and of itself, a substantive,
extrinsic limit on Commerce Clause authority.
234. Id.




Commerce Clause doctrine is untrue.' As Breyer argued in his dissent, it is
perfectly possible to find that Congress had a rational basis for deciding that gun
possession in schools substantially affects interstate commerce. 7 By not admitting
that Lopez changes the principles of Commerce Clause review, Rehnquist leaves
those principles unnecessarily vague and ambiguous.
Rehnquist's distinction between commercial and noncommercial activities is the
most substantive guidance Lopez offers. But even that distinction is vague in its
application, as cases both before and after Lopez show." Commerce Clause
history has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of clear principle in determining
what is commerce and what is not. The categorization of commercial and
noncommercial activities, left to definition by the various members of the federal
bench, invites ambiguity and pliability. Lopez demands a judicial decision as to the
degree of economic connectedness of a given activity; and in modem economics,
everything is interconnected. Rehnquist opens the door to the same goblins that
chased the Court away from formalistic Commerce Clause analysis sixty years
before?9
Rehnquist is correct in arguing that the judiciary must have a role in the
determination of the extent of Commerce Clause power.2 Neither Breyer nor any
of the other dissenters offer any real limit to Commerce Clause authority under their
versions of the rational basis test. Clearly a fundamental principle in the
constitutional scheme is that too much danger of tyranny exists to risk relying solely
upon Congress to restrain itself from intruding upon the liberties of the people and
the powers of the states. The process of the legislature requires consideration of
issues policy by policy, not principle by principle. Complete deference to the
legislature would ask Congress to determine constitutional principles in the pressure
cooker of policy debate - the exact moment where the government's natural
temptation to increase its own power is at its greatest. Moreover, it is unwise to
argue that democracy alone is an adequate safeguard to federal tyranny; the danger
of tyranny is inherent to democracy.' The preservation of rights and liberties
236. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
237. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial - or, worse yet, economic and non-
economic - activities has by no means developed into a clear or useful line for judicial review. Cf., e.g.,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (holding that Congress could not regulate the
relationship between coal factory employers and employees because production did not directly affect
interstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 because of the effect of labor standards on interstate commerce);
cf also, e.g., United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding the Child
Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228, to be beyond federal Commerce Clause power because the
CSRA is a criminal rather than a commercial or economic statute), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding the CSRA to be within Commerce
Clause authority because the nonpayment of child support is an economic activity).
239. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
240. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
241. Still the clearest analysis of the dangers of tyranny of the majority is from ALEXIS DE
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from the tyranny of the majority is a role assigned to - and most suited to - the
judiciary, that branch least affected by the potential excesses of a democratic
majority.
B. How Far Does the Pendulum Swing? A Heightened Standard for Judicial
Review of Federal Commerce Clause Authority
In Lopez, Rehnquist seeks to define the point of division of state and federal
power according to the dictates of the Commerce Clause. Let me suggest that the
Court asks the wrong question. The central question for judicial review of
federalism is not where the divide is between state and federal power but where the
divide is between that power which could - if the people so choose - be federal
and that which - regardless of democratic choice - must remain to the states. The
balance of state and federal power is largely, but not completely, z" subject to the
democratic process. The people, within the structure of the Constitution, have the
ability to assign, to a certain extent, where the power of government will reside.
The role of the Court is to determine which activities are, according to the dictates
of the Commerce Clause, beyond the discretion of Congress to classify as subject
to state or federal authority. The pendulum marking the balance of state and federal
power swings wide, but it does not swing forever.
Upon consideration of federal attempts to regulate activities traditionally subject
to state sovereignty, a heightened standard should be imposed to scrutinize whether
Congress is attempting to seize power beyond that which is subject to division by
the democratic process. The need for a standard higher than the mere rationality of
the legislature is justified in such instances by the lessened necessity of deference
to the legislature.
The guiding principle of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, beginning with
Gibbons v. Ogden,"' has been judicial deference to the legislature, and for good
reason. First, the Supreme Court has found it extraordinarily difficult to determine
the extent of Commerce Clause authority without devolving into economic policy
making, as clearly occurred in the decisions of the early twentieth century.'
During that period, inquiries into economic policy required by formalistic tests and
definitions broke down the walls of judicial restraint and sent the Court spinning out
into the unfamiliar and unintended territory of policy determination. Justices were
not exercising judgment, with its inherent limitations of text and precedent, but
choosing economic policy, with only a five-person majority of unelected, lifetime-
tenured votes needed to sustain any measure. Shaken by this conflict, the New Deal
Era Court returned to the protections of deference to the legislature and, thus,
ensured its own restraint from abuse of power.2"
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 112-22 (Mentor ed., 1956).
242. Save by Constitutional amendment.
243. 22 U.S. (9 Wh -at.) 1 (1824).
244. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).




Second, the Court has recognized that Congress is better able to make policy
decisions about which activities substantially affect interstate commerce. The
legislature reflects popular will and is, thus, more adaptable to the changing
circumstances of the marketplace. Also, Congress is capable of independent, large-
scale fact-finding, an ability not shared by the Court.
Third, and perhaps most important, is the role of the people themselves in
determining the balance of state and federal power. In the Federalist No. 46,
Madison argues that the balance of state and federal power will be determined by
the success of each government in earning the people's trust. Madison writes:
If... the people should in future become more partial to the federal
than to the State governments, the change can only result from such
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will over-
come all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence
where they may discover it to be most due. . ..
As circumstances change, and the needs and trust of the people change, the political
branches of government respond and power is divided accordingly. The power of
government is divided as the people desire, making the possibility of diminishment
a caution against tyranny. Further, leaving the balance of power to the desire of the
people was itself thought to be an encouragement to civic virtue, trusting the people
to find within themselves the ability to govern themselves. 7
Deference to the legislature, however, should not be raised up as an all-
encompassing ideal. The democratic process is not the sole safeguard of liberty.
The express delegations of power in the Constitution - and the preservation of
all other power to the states and to the people - also serve that end. Madison
also argued for limits to the reach of federal power, writing "[T]he State
governments ...have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain
sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously ad-
ministered.' '45  Federal attempts to regulate activities traditionally subject to
state sovereignty mark the point where the judiciary must set aside a degree of
deference to the legislature and independently inquire as to whether the attempted
regulation is authorized by the Commerce Clause. There is a limit to the swing
of the balance of power, and that limit should be subject to, and defined by,
judicial review at the hands of the Supreme Court.
The imposition of a heightened standard of scrutiny upon federal regulation of
activities traditionally subject to state sovereignty asks a question capable of answer
by the Court on the basis of constitutional principle. Such an inquiry would not
force the judiciary into the arena of economic policy making - a task which it has
amply demonstrated it is unequipped to handle. 9
246. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966).
247. See ELUS, supra note 15.
248. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Arlington House ed., 1966).
249. SeeJustice Souter's remarks characterizing the Loclmer line of decisions and Commerce Clause
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Moreover, heightened scrutiny would allow real and practical - albeit
moderate - limits on federal encroachment on state power without infringing
upon the function of federalism as a check on tyranny and an encouragement to
civic virtue. The elective power to determine - to a large but not complete
extent - the balance of state and federal power would be preserved.
Note that the "rule" or test of whether an activity is subject to federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause power would not change in formulation. The inquiry
remains whether the activity sought to be regulated substantially affects interstate
commerce. The heightened standard results not from a change in the definitional
test of Commerce Clause authority but from a change in the body which primarily
determines whether an activity has a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to
allow federal action.
The measure of the effect of an activity on interstate commerce should include
a consideration of the commercial or economic nature of the activity sought to be
regulated, the sufficiency of state regulation, and the need for national - rather
than local - government control. The requirement in Lopez that the activity which
the federal government is attempting to regulate be commercial or economic in
nature is overdue. However, the requirement is also, as the decisions of the lower
courts show, not likely to lead to a discernible limit on federal power. It is useful
only as a landmark of the outer boundaries of Commerce Clause authority.
Largely lacking in the various attempts at construction of a theory of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is the incorporation of a most practical and fundamental
principle of our representative democracy: The federal government should be
sovereign where uniform, national measures are necessary, and the states should be
sovereign where state action is sufficient. Still the clearest articulation of the nature
of the Constitution's division of state and federal power is from Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to
those which are completely within a particular State, which do not
affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government.'
At its essence, a theory of the extent of Commerce Clause authority must ask the
practical question of whether the activity sought to be regulated is, as regarding
interstate commerce, an external concern of the nation or an internal concern which
affects the states generally. If neither, the activity is properly the subject of state
sovereignty.
jurisprudence in the early 20th Century as a "chastening era" in Supreme Court history. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. at 1652. See supra te~t accompanying notes 103-08.




The central question is judicial review: When must the Court act and what role
may it responsibly play? The consideration of the necessity of national regulation
in determining the effect of an activity on interstate commerce incorporates a
practical understanding of the intent and values of our dual system of government
into Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Federal intrusion into areas of traditional state
sovereignty present a situation where the judiciary must forsake a degree of caution
regarding its inability to refrain from the abuse of judicial power and take action
against a greater threat.
The attempt here at a better method of judicial review of Commerce Clause
authority is a moderate approach. This method contemplates a slight but significant
change in the understanding of the Supreme Courts role in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and a slight but significant change in the decisions that would result.
It is an approach that values the contributions of the division of power between state
and federal governments. It is an approach that values the role of the people in
determining how that power is divided. Most importantly, it is an approach that
allows the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review of Commerce Clause authority
in a restrained and principled manner. The use of a heightened standard of scrutiny
where the federal government has sought to regulate an activity traditionally subject
to state sovereignty would allow the pendulum of state and federal power to be
controlled by the people, but would ensure that the reach of that pendulum is bound
by the enumerated powers of the Constitution.
V. Conclusion
Following the decision in Lopez, commentators predicted results ranging from
radical changes in Commerce Clause jurisprudence to no change at all. The
Supreme Courts holding in Lopez permits both these interpretations. The early
progeny for the most part follow the more restrictive view; but, certainly there is
support in the opinion for a judicially enforced resurgence of state sovereignty.
The failure of the judiciary to impose limits on the reach of federal Commerce
Clause power stands as a distant but significant threat to state autonomy and
individual liberty. However, a judicially enforced curtailment of the power of the
people to divide power between the state and federal governments according to their
own trust and wisdom would represent at least as great an usurpation of power as
ever accomplished by the federal government through the use of the Commerce
Clause. This note suggests that the use of a heightened standard of scrutiny of
federal attempts to regulate activities traditionally subject to state sovereignty would
allow the pendulum of state and federal power to be controlled by the democratic
process, while ensuring that the reach of that pendulum is bound by the enumerated
powers of the Constitution.
The balance of state and federal power is too critical to the American scheme of
government to be left to definition by lower courts on the basis of the hazy
principles articulated in United States v. Lopez. A careful consideration of judicial
review of federalism is in order.
Charles Barnes Goodwin
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